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How are group symbols (e.g., a ag, a Muslim veil, a clothing
style) helpful in sustaining cooperation and social norms? We
study the role of symbols in an innitely repeated public goods
game with random matching, endogenous partnership termina-
tion, limited information ows and endogenous symbol choice.
We characterize an e¢ cient segregating equilibrium, in which
players only cooperate with others bearing the same symbol. In
this equilibrium, players bearing a scarcer symbol face a longer
expected search time to nd a cooperative partner upon partner-
ship termination, and this sacrice of outside options allows them
to sustain higher levels of cooperation. We compare this equilib-
rium to other equilibria in terms of renegotiation proofness, and
we discuss the relation this has to the evolution of intolerance.
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"I didnt understand what was happening at rst. People started
talking to me more. (...) And I was made to feel like I was actually
from this planet. Maybe I was nally tting in? But then it became
shy. The Muslim taxi drivers who would almost always say "Assalamu
Alaikum," ask me where Im from or if Im single, or not allow me to
pay for the fare became cold and dry. (...) Have I become unfriendly?
Arrogant? But other people had become even nicer. (...) Then it
hit me. My knit hat and winter scarf covered my hijab (the head scarf
part) entirely and all that was visible were my eyes behind my wannabe
hipster glasses (...). They didnt even knowI was Muslim."
(leenamielus, "I Took O¤My Hijab", http://leenamielus.blogspot.be)
1 Introduction
Migration and globalization have given rise to a surge of nationalism,
xenophobia and radicalism all over the globe. As such, cultural diversity
and societal polarization are high on the policy agenda in most countries.
The social tensions and debates often focus on various cultural markers
or group symbols, as illustrated by the ban of the Muslim veil in several
European countries. But the exact importance and functioning of these
group symbols remains more obscure. These group symbols, e.g., a ag,
a Muslim veil, a T-shirt of a rock band or an expensive corporate style
suit, function in various ways as coordination devices. On one hand, they
reveal information about underlying heterogeneity. Strangers can form
a reasonably accurate idea about ones socioeconomic background and
tastes from a casual observation of ones clothing and lifestyle. On the
other hand, symbols strengthen group identication and loyalty. By dis-
playing the above symbols, one is met with initial sympathy from some
strangers, and with aversion from others. Tajfel and Turners (1979) fa-
mous minimal group experimentshows that symbols can give rise to a
di¤erential sympathy or hostility towards strangers, even if these sym-
bols are understood to reect no underlying heterogeneity.1 While these
ndings gave rise to an extensive body of literature and numerous repli-
cations, the underlying mechanisms are relatively poorly understood.
Iannaccone (1992) presents an interesting interpretation of the role of
symbols in the context of cults and sects. He understands these symbols
1Tajfel and Turner (1979) randomly allocated a minimal marker to test subjects,
e.g. a colored dot on the forehead, and found that such a minimal symbol su¢ ced to
cause participants to discriminate between complete strangers on the basis of their
symbol, even in the absence of any underlying heterogeneity. Test subjects bestowed
advantages on strangers bearing the same symbol, at the expense of others bearing
a di¤erent symbol.
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as a solution for a typical group problem: the underprovision of a club
good. The standard solution in club theory is to levy membership fees,
and then use the revenues to subsidize contributions to the club good
(see e.g., Sandler and Tschirhart (1997)). But if such a formal scheme
is unfeasible or undesirable, Iannaccone (1992) suggests, then a cult or
sect can taxresources spent outside the group. If members contribute
time to the club good, such a tax takes the form of restrictions on
membersclothing, diet, haircut or language, all of which impede social
interactions with non-members. By sacricing their capacity for social
interactions outside the group, these typical idiosyncrasies of religious,
political or subcultural groups help members to commit their resources
to the group.
The sacrice of outside options in order to demonstrate commitment
and sustain cooperation and group norms is documented by social sci-
entists in a variety of contexts. Gambetta (2009, p.41) discusses how
prisoners demonstrate their commitment to a life in crime by apply-
ing prison tattoos on visible body parts, thus ruining their chances of
an honest life. Gambetta (2009, p.19) equally describes how candidate
members of Colombian youth gangs are required to kill a friend or family
member. Besides proving ones ability to murder, it also shatters gang
members fall back option for leaving the gang. Berman (2000) doc-
uments these sacrice mechanisms for the case of ultra-orthodox Jews.
Berndt (2007) shows how being a member of a distinct and despised eth-
nic or religious minority, and the implied lack of outside options, allowed
e.g., 19th century Jewish peddlers to act as middlemen in high stake -
nancial transactions. Shimizu (2011) models self-sacrice in military
and terrorist groups as a result of giving up individual autonomy. Ai-
mone et al. (2013) nd that the possibility of sacricing private outside
options enhances club good contributions in a Voluntary Contribution
Mechanism experiment.
Yet, the ability of symbols to discipline group members behavior
crucially depends on their damaging e¤ect on membersoutside options,
i.e., on non-membersreactions to these symbols. The literature follow-
ing Iannaccone (1992) typically assumes a negative reaction to the group
symbols as exogenously given. While such a reaction is inherent in some
cases, such as killing family members, it is much less obvious for more
arbitrary and minimal symbols, such as clothing or hair color. A rst
contribution of the present paper is that we derive symbol choices, the
reactions to symbols and the resulting cooperation levels, all jointly from
a notion of equilibrium.
We study the role of symbols in the context of an innitely repeated
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public goods game, with random matching, endogenous partnership ter-
mination and limited information ows. We consider an innite popu-
lation of homogeneous players, who di¤er ex ante only in a visible but
payo¤-irrelevant symbol (e.g., a colored hat). Players begin each round
with one partner, with whom they play a stage game consisting of two
phases. First, they play a public goods game. Second, upon observing
the public goods games outcome, both players simultaneously decide
whether to terminate the partnership or not, and whether to change
their symbol at a certain cost. Partnerships break up if at least one
partner wishes to terminate, and are otherwise terminated exogenously
with a small probability. Furthermore, players whose partnership was
terminated are then randomly rematched. Starting a new partnership,
players have no information about their partners past play, but only
observe his symbol.
We characterize an e¢ cient segregating equilibrium of this game, in
which players exert no e¤ort in the public goods game if their partner
bears a di¤erent symbol. Consequently, such heterogeneous partnerships
are a waste of time, and are immediately terminated by both players.
In partnerships which are homogeneous in terms of symbols, players
exert the maximal incentive compatible e¤ort. Failure to comply with
the equilibrium e¤ort in a homogeneous partnership is punished with
partnership termination, thus implying in expectation a certain search
time to nd a new identical symbol partner to start cooperating with.
Therefore, players bearing a more scarce symbol face in expectation a
longer search for a cooperative partner after a break-up, and this sacrice
of outside options allows them - in the spirit of Iannaccone (1992) - to
sustain higher cooperation levels.
This paper relates to a large body of literature on cooperation in in-
nitely repeated public goods or prisoners dilemma games. The central
question in this literature is how to constrain the continuation payo¤s
of defectors in order to sustain cooperation on the equilibrium path, de-
spite of defection being the stage games dominant strategy. However,
the present setting excludes a large number of well-known mechanisms
that sustain cooperation. First, endogenous partnership termination
and random rematching excludes the entire class of personal enforce-
ment mechanisms, in which cheating triggers a punishment by the vic-
tim. Because defectors can terminate a partnership before undergoing
their punishment, the usual folk theorems and trigger strategy results
do no apply. Second, the absence of information about a partners past
play in previous partnerships excludes community enforcement mecha-
nisms, in which shirkers are identied and punished by other members
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of the population.2 Third, even though the contagion mechanisms of
Kandori (1992) and Ellison (1994) can sustain cooperation if players are
randomly rematched and only aware of their own history of play, they
are excluded in this setting by the continuum population.3
The literature has nevertheless advanced two mechanisms to sustain
cooperation in the present restrictive setting. A rst solution relies on
gradual trust-building or incubation.4 In these equilibria, partners only
engage in full cooperation after a su¢ ciently long trust-building or in-
cubationphase, i.e., a number of rounds in which they defect or exert
low e¤ort. The prospect of a trust-building stage with a new partner
su¢ ces to deter players from cheating in the later stages of a partner-
ship.5 A second solution relies on the presence of exogenous defectors in
the population, which gives the situation of having a cooperative part-
ner su¢ cient scarcity value to discourage defection.6 Ghosh and Ray
(1996) show how cooperation in a public goods game is sustainable if
the defectorspopulation share is neither too small nor too large. Ad-
verse selection, due to the defectors always having to draw a new partner
while patient cooperators lock themselves into long term partnerships,
means that a small population share of defectors can su¢ ce to sustain
cooperation among patient players. Moreover, Ghosh and Ray (1996)
demonstrate how their equilibrium satises bilateral rationality, i.e., it
is robust against bilateral renegotiation by current partners.
The present paper also contributes to this literature in the sense that
we study a setting similar to Ghosh and Rays (1996) repeated public
goods game, but in which the role of the exogenous defectors is played in
2Sustaining cooperation through punishments by other community members has
been shown e¤ective under various information assumptions by e.g. Greif (1993),
Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite (1995), Mailath and Morris (2000) or Takahaski
(2010).
3In these equilibria, players defect in all their future partnerships if their part-
ner cheats. If players are su¢ ciently patient, they are dissuaded from defecting by
the foresight of eventually triggering the entire population to defect forever. In the
present setting, a defection eventually infects at most countably many out of un-
countably many players into defecting.
4See e.g. Datta (1996), Kranton (1996), Eeckhout (2006), Fujiwara-Greve and
Okuno-Fujiwara (2009) or Fujiwara-Greve et al. (2012). This approach also relates
to the idea of starting smallin Watson (1999, 2002), where the stakes of the game
gradually increase with the partnerships age.
5Deb and González-Díaz (2014) show how these results depend on the structure of
the prisoners dilemma stage game. Slight modications in the payo¤ structure break
down the standard results and imply a need for more sophisticated trust-building
techniques.
6Related mechnisms are also studied by e.g. Fujiwara-Greve and Okuno-Fujiwara
(2009) and Schumacher (2013).
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equilibrium by endogenous group symbols. Hence, we assume no pref-
erence heterogeneity, but rather derive that players act in equilibrium
much like defectors towards others bearing a di¤erent symbol. In this
equilibrium, players bearing di¤erent symbols face generically di¤erent
incentives. In the spirit of Iannaccone (1992), players can thus sacrice
their outside options by bearing a more scarce symbol, and this sacrice
allows them to sustain higher cooperation levels. Finally, we also char-
acterize the segregating equilibrium in terms of a parametrized criterion
of renegotiation proofness, named "-renegotiation proofness, which elim-
inates the gradual trust-building equilibria and allows us to di¤erentiate
between the games di¤erent equilibria.
The importance of payo¤ irrelevant group symbols for cooperation
is also central in Eeckhout (2006) and Choy (2014).7 Eeckhout (2006)
studies a public correlation device such as skin color in an innitely
repeated prisoners dilemma with endogenous partnership termination
and limited information. Eeckhout compares a standard (color-blind)
incubation equilibrium to a segregation equilibrium, in which new part-
ners of the same color start cooperating immediately, while other new
partners play an incubation strategy. Eeckhout shows that color distrib-
utions exist for which the segregation equilibrium Pareto dominates the
color-blind equilibrium.
Choy (2014) is the closest to our paper. He studies how segregation
on the basis of visible group a¢ liations helps to sustain cooperation in an
innitely repeated public goods game. Choy assumes that players also
know the group a¢ liation of their partnersprevious partners and that
groups are hierarchically ranked. He characterizes a renegotiation proof
segregating equilibrium, in which players refuse to interact with members
of lower groups to protect their reputation. Preserving this reputation
implies higher search costs upon partnership termination, which in turn
helps to sustain more cooperation. In contrast with Choy (2014), we
assume no information about a partners past play, and unlike Eeckhout
(2006) and Choy (2014), we consider symbols a choice variable.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The formal
setting and equilibrium concept are introduced in Section 2. Section 3
discusses how symbols are helpful in sustaining cooperation by character-
izing the e¢ cient segregating equilibrium. In Section 4, we characterize
the e¢ cient segregating and other equilibria in terms of a parametrized
version of renegotiation proofness, and we discuss the relationship with
7See also Peski and Szentes (2013) on how payo¤ irrelevant symbols can lead to
discriminatory behavior.
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various forms of chauvinistic preferences. The nal Section concludes.
All proofs and derivations are detailed in the Appendix.
2 Formal Setting
Assume a continuum of players. Time is indexed by t 2 N, and all players
have the same discount factor 0   < 1: Each player wears one publicly
visible symbol out of a given set of symbols S = fsigi=1;:::;n. Players
start each round of the game with one partner: We call a partnership
between two players homogeneous if both bear the same symbol, and we
otherwise call it heterogeneous.
In each round of the game, players rst play a public goods game
with their current partner. After observing the public goods games out-
come and inferring their partners contribution, players decide on sym-
bol change and partnership termination. The symbol switching cost of a
player who begins a round t with symbol si and ends it with symbol sj
is denoted ct (i; j) ; with ct (:)  0 and ct (i; j) = 0 if i = j: For simplicity,
we assume that these switching costs are independent of t. Partnerships
are exogenously terminated with probability  2 (0; 1]. Otherwise, both
players choose whether or not to continue the partnership, l 2 f0; 1g,
where l = 1 means continuing the partnership. A partnership ends if
at least one of the partners wishes to terminate it. If their partner-
ship is terminated, players randomly draw a new partner from the set
of players whose partnership was terminated with uniform probability.
Of course, the assumption of exogenous partnership termination ensures
that drawing a new partner is uninformative about past behavior on the
equilibrium path.8 When meeting a new partner, players do not observe
his past behavior but only see his symbol.
We rst formally characterize the public goods game. In this game,
both partners choose a level of e¤orts e 2 R+. A player who contributes
e while his partner contributes e0 obtains a stage payo¤  (e; e0). If
k and kh denote the partial derivative of  w.r.t. argument k and
w.r.t. arguments k and h; respectively, then the following restrictions
on the public goods game technology are imposed.
Condition 1 Let  be a twice continuously di¤erentiable function such
that:
1. (Public goods game) 1 (e; :) < 0 for all e > 0; 2 (:) > 0 and
1 (e; e) + 2 (e; e) > 0 for all e  0;
8On the equilibrium path, players never terminate a homogeneous partnership
such that, in equilibrium, a new partners previous homogeneous partnership was
exogenously terminated with probability 1.
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2. (Boundedness)  (e; e) is bounded for all e 2 R+; and 9 > 0 such
that 2 > ;
3. (Initial condition) let  (0; 0) = 0; while 1 (0; :) = 0, and 11 (0; 0) <
0:
The rst part of condition 1 ensures that  represents a public goods
game: the payo¤s are decreasing with own e¤ort, such that zero e¤ort is
a dominant strategy in the stage game, and increasing with the partners
e¤ort. Moreover, coordinating symmetrically on a higher e¤ort level is
always mutually benecial. The next two parts of condition 1 impose
some regularity conditions to ensure that the playersproblem and be-
havior is always well dened. Part 2 of condition 1 bounds the benets
of symmetric e¤orts, implying that lime!1 1 (e; e) + 2 (e; e) = 0; and
bounds marginal benets of the partners e¤orts away from zero. Part 3
of condition 1 normalizes  to be zero in the absence of any contribution
and ensures that our problem is well dened near zero. The following
simple example shows a public goods game technology which satises the
above condition and will serve as a closed form example in the remainder
of this text.
Example 1 The payo¤ function
 (e; e0) = 1 + e0   e  1
1 + e
satises condition 1, as 1 (e; :) =  1 + 1(1+e)2 < 0 for e > 0; 2 (:) =
1 > 0 and 1 (e; e) + 2 (e; e) = 1(1+e)2 > 0 for all e 2 R+. Moreover,
 (e; e) = e
1+e
is bounded from above by 1,  (0; 0) = 0 and 1 (0; :) = 0:
The information of a player at the beginning of round t; denoted
ht 2 Ht; consists of the fundamentals of the game, the symbol of his
current partner, and their history of play in the current partnership.9
Let H  [tHt be the set of all possible information sets.
9Hence, these information assumptions keep players from conditioning their be-
havior on what happened in their previous partnerships. On one hand, note that
players run into one of their past partners again with zero probability, because even
for t!1; players have met at most countably many out of uncountably many play-
ers. On the other hand, our equilibrium concept excludes players from conditioning
their behavior on private histories of play (cfr. infra).
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A pure strategy  : H ! R+  f0; 1gR+  SR+ species a triplet
(et; lt; st) for all t and possible information sets ht.10 The rst element
species how much e¤ort to exert given the symbol of the current partner
and the history of play. The second element species, for each ht; a
termination decision for all possible e¤ort levels of the partner e0t:
lt : R+ ! f0; 1g :
Similarly, the last element species a symbol switching decision as a
function of the partners e¤ort e0t. We say that a strategy is public if it
is conditioned only on the partnerspublic information.11
Players evaluate a strategy by considering the expected future payo¤
streams to which a strategy is expected to give rise; i.e., they wish to
maximize
u ()  E
X
t
t ( (et; e
0
t)  ct (i; j)) ;
in which the expectation operator E indicates the expectations over
all possible future histories of play and symbols of partners to which a
strategy  may lead, given the strategies of other players as well as the
stochastic processes of partnership termination and formation. We study
the stationary perfect public equilibria (PPE) of this game, i.e., proles
of public strategies which yield for all t and all ht a Nash equilibrium for
round t and all consecutive rounds.
3 Symbols and cooperation
This Section characterizes one particular stationary PPE in pure strate-
gies, designated the e¢ cient segregating PPE, which we will focus on in
this paper. This PPE is in the following sense e¢ cient and segregating
in terms of symbols.
Denition 1 (E¢ cient segregating PPE) The e¢ cient segregating
PPE is a stationary PPE in pure strategies in which players
10As usual, Y X represents the set of all mappings from X to Y: Note that this
formulation is equivalent with players making termination and symbol switching
decisions at the second phase of round t as a function of an intermediate history of
play, which comprises ht and the e¤ort strategies in round ts public goods game.
A partners e¤ort choice constitutes the only new information at this intermediate
stage of round t:
11Note that allowing players to condition their choices on their private histories
of play, i.e., their play in previous partnerships, would introduce asymmetric infor-
mation into the game. This would complicate the analysis considerably, as it would
require us to introduce beliefs about a partners private information as well as to
have strategies equally depending on these beliefs.
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1. exert e¤ort 0 in heterogeneous partnerships and, for all i; the max-
imal e¤ort level which is incentive compatible, denoted ei; in ho-
mogeneous si partnerships;
2. never switch symbol,
3. never terminate a homogeneous partnership on the equilibrium path
but always terminate a heterogeneous partnership,
4. terminate a partnership after any deviation from equilibrium play,
including deviations from equilibrium reactions to deviations, etc.
Hence, segregating indicates that players exert only strictly positive
e¤ort in a homogeneous partnership.12 As a result, a heterogeneous part-
nership is a waste of time and is thus terminated immediately. Although
players never switch symbols in equilibrium, the ability to switch sym-
bols is relevant, because it allows us to characterize how symbol switch-
ing costs determine the equilibrium symbol frequencies, and ultimately
which patterns of cooperation can be sustained in equilibrium. The
equilibrium is e¢ cient in the sense that players exert the maximal level
of e¤ort which can be sustained in a homogeneous partnership. Note
that this form of e¢ ciency is stronger than Pareto e¢ ciency, because a
strategy prole in which two partners respectively exert e¤orts on and
strictly below the incentive compatibility constraint is Pareto e¢ cient,
but not e¤ecient in the above sense. Since two players bearing the same
symbol face the same incentives, the e¢ cient segregating PPE is sym-
metric in the sense that two players in a homogeneous partnership exert
the same e¤ort. In the remainder of this Section, we proceed with steps
to characterize the e¢ cient segregating PPE.
Let pi denote the stationary share symbol si players in the set of
all players who draw a new partner (i.e., the stationary probability of a
randomly drawn partner having symbol si). In the e¢ cient segregating
PPE, the expected continuation value of an si player in a homogeneous
partnership is recursively dened as:
vi
 
ei

= 
 
ei; ei

+  (1  ) vi  ei+ wi  ei ; (1)
in which wi (ei) is the expected continuation value of an si player starting
the round with a randomly drawn partner:
wi
 
ei

= pivi
 
ei

+
 
1  pi wi  ei : (2)
12Of course, equivalent equilibria can be conceived in which players treat a subset
of symbols as if it were the same symbol. In this case, one can easily understand the
elements of S as partitions of a larger set of symbols.
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Hence, in equilibrium both players get a stage payo¤  (ei; ei) in a ho-
mogeneous si partnership, after which their partnership survives to the
next round with probability 1  ; and is terminated otherwise. In case
of termination, the si players immediately draw a new si partner with
probability pi; in which case they start cooperating immediately and
thus return to continuation value vi (ei). Otherwise they get stage pay-
o¤ zero, terminate the partnership, and start the next round again with
a randomly drawn partner, having continuation value wi (ei).
Incentive compatibility requires that an si player is not worse o¤
when providing the equilibrium e¤ort level ei; rather than defecting on
his partner and starting anew with a new partner in the next period,
i.e.,
vi
 
ei
    0; ei+ wi  ei ; (3)
while e¢ ciency implies that (3) must be satised with equality. Solving
(1) and (2) for vi and wi and substituting into (3) ; we dene
d
 
e; pi
  vi (e)   (0; e)  wi (e)
=
 (e; e)
1   (1  ) (1  pi)    (0; e) ;
such that (3) can be written as d (ei; pi)  0: Note that
d (e; 0) =
 (e; e)
1   (1  )    (0; e)
is the di¤erence between the expected actual value of the current part-
nership, when cooperating at e¤ort level e; and the one shot payo¤ of
cheating. If players have no hope of nding a new cooperative partner
after break-up, e.g., because pi = 0; then incentive compatibility requires
d (e; 0)  0: However, note that d decreases with pi. Indeed, the possi-
bility of a new partnership with another cooperative si player decreases
the punishment that breaking up the present partnership constitutes,
and it thus reduces the e¤ort levels players can commit to. As a result,
we obtain the following e¤ort levels in the e¢ cient segregating PPE.
Proposition 1 In the e¢ cient segregating PPE, the equilibrium e¤ort
in homogeneous si partnerships, ei; uniquely solves
ei = max

ejd  e; pi = 0	 : (4)
Moreover, ei is a left-continuous and strictly decreasing function of pi
and ; and a right-continuous and strictly increasing function of :
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Hence, players with more scarce symbols face a worse outside option,
and this allows them to sustain higher e¤ort levels. Moreover, e¤ort
levels are increasing with the e¤ectivediscount factor  (1  ), i.e., if
the value of a current homogeneous partnership increases because players
become more patient or because the expected longevity of their present
partnership increases.
Example 2 In the closed form example, (e;e)
(0;e)
= 1
1+e
strictly decreases
with e; such that ei is a continuous function of pi: The equilibrium e¤ort
levels are
ei =
(1  pi)  (1  )
1  (1  pi)  (1  ) :
We can now characterize the relationship between pi and the share
of the population bearing symbol si: Let xit denote the proportion of s
i
players that start round t with a new partner, and note that xit follows
a simple Markov dynamic:
xit+1 =
 
1  pi (1  )xit +   1  xit : (5)
Symbol si players currently in a homogeneous partnership only have
to draw a new partner if their partnership was exogenously terminated
(with probability ), and a fraction 1 (1 )pi of si players who play the
present round with a new partner will have to do so as well in the next
round. In the stationary equilibrium, it must be that xit = x
i
t+1 = x
i;
such that we obtain the following result.
Proposition 2 For all i, a share xi = 
pi+(1 pi) of all s
i players draw
a new partner in the e¢ cient segregating PPE. Moreover, pi strictly
exceeds the population share of si players i¤ pi <
P
j (p
j)
2
:
Hence, in equilibrium, si players spend on average a fraction xi of
their time meeting noncooperative partners, and this share of their time
going to waste increases with the probability of break-up  and de-
creases with the probability of randomly drawing another si player. This
longer expected waiting time is precisely the sacrice that allows play-
ers bearing a scarce symbol to sustain higher levels of cooperation. By
Bayes rule, the share of the population bearing symbol si, nally, is
then p
i
xi
P
j
pj
xj
 1
; and this share exceeds pi if pi <
P
j (p
j)
2
: In this
case, si players are more likely to draw another si partner from the pool
of players searching for a new partner than they would be when draw-
ing from the population at large. As such, they are overrepresented in
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the set of players drawing a new partner (i.e., pi overstates their overall
population share). Note that this selection e¤ect di¤ers from the ad-
verse selection e¤ect in Ghosh and Ray (1996), where the myopic types
are overrepresented in the set of players drawing a new partner, because
patient players lock themselves into long-term cooperative partnerships,
unlike myopic players. In the e¢ cient segregating PPE, the selection ef-
fect softens any asymmetries in symbol frequencies. Because they spend
more time looking for a same symbol partner, players bearing a scarce
symbol have more chance of nding a same symbol partner in the pool
of players looking for a new partner than in the population at large. In
the next Section, we show that other symbol-dependent PPE can exhibit
the opposite selection e¤ect. Finally, note also that most of the results
in the above Propositions remain valid if players are disproportionately
more likely to draw a same symbol partner, e.g., because real world in-
teractions display a certain degree of homophily. In this case, pi would
be higher than if players were to draw a partner with uniform probabil-
ity from the set of players searching for new partners. The share of time
wasted looking for a same symbol partner after a break-up, xi, would
then be lower, and consequently the e¤ort levels that can be sustained,
ei; would decrease as well. As such, it is only the relationship between
pi and the population share of si players that is di¤erent if we allow for
this kind of homophily in the random matching process.
Players bearing scarce symbols can commit to higher e¤orts due to
the longer expected search time, but only if they can be trusted not to
switch to another symbol after a break-up. As such, the matrix of sym-
bol switching costs (ct (i; j))i;j=1;:::;n determines which vectors of symbol
frequencies p are compatible with an e¢ cient segregating PPE, or, equiv-
alently, what kind of symbol switching costs are required to sustain a cer-
tain level of cooperation in equilibrium. Players can unilaterally switch
symbols in the following cases: when in a homogeneous partnership and
exerting equilibrium e¤orts, when in a homogeneous partnership after
deviating from the equilibrium e¤ort, and before drawing a new partner
(i.e., when currently in a heterogeneous partnership). The two latter op-
tions give exactly the same continuation values and are therefore payo¤
equivalent. Furthermore the rst option is dominated by these two latter
options: a player in a homogeneous si partnership who exerts ei and then
switches symbol without breaking up will face a partner exerting zero
e¤ort and breaking up the partnership in the next round.13 Therefore
13Given that equilibrium e¤orts are required to be subgame perfect, this implies
that a deviating reaction to symbol switching should correspond to a partner exerting
zero e¤orts and terminating the partnership, etc.
13
the player can strictly improve payo¤s by exerting no e¤ort, switching
symbols and terminating the partnership himself. Considering therefore
the incentives in the two latter cases, we observe that an si player will
not choose to unilaterally switch symbol (to sj, say) if:
vi
 
ei
    0; ei+ wj  ej  ct (i; j) : (6)
Substituting (3) satised with equality into (6) ; we obtain the following
characterization of unilateral symbol switching.
Proposition 3 In the segregating PPE, no si players switch to symbol
sj if
wj
 
ej
  wi  ei  c (i; j)

:
The symbol frequencies compatible with the e¢ cient segregating
PPE thus depend on the switching costs and on the shape of w; the
expected continuation values when beginning a partnership with a ran-
domly drawn new partner. Using (1), (2) and (3) ; we write
wi
 
ei

=
pi (0; ei)
1   :
The following Lemma characterizes the shape of wi (ei) as a function of
pi:
Lemma 1 In the e¢ cient segregating PPE, wi (ei) is a left-continuous,
positive function of pi; which decreases at any discontinuity and is such
that
lim
pi!0
wi
 
ei

= lim
pi!1
wi
 
ei

= 0:
Moreover, wi (ei) increases with pi, where wi (ei) is di¤erentiable w.r.t.
pi; i¤
@d(ei;0)
@ei
 0:
Hence, the matrix of symbol switching costs imposes a bound on
the maximal di¤erence in continuation values with a randomly drawn
partner. The continuation value of si players with a new randomly drawn
partner approaches zero for extreme values of pi. If pi ! 1; the almost
certainty of nding a new si partner in the next round prevents them
from committing to signicant e¤ort levels. If pi ! 0; then the inability
of nding a new si partner after a partnership termination drives wi (ei)
to zero, despite si players being able to sustain the highest possible e¤ort
level in a homogenous partnership, which we denote
~e  max fejd (e; 0) = 0g :
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Hence, ~e is the e¤ort level that can only be sustained by partners who
know they will never again nd a cooperative partner after the termi-
nation of their present partnership. Starting from pi = 0, it is plausible
to see the continuation value of si players, wi; initially increase with
pi; because the decrease in sustainable e¤orts, ei, is initially more than
compensated for by an increased likelihood of nding a new si partner.
In particular, and for future purposes, we dene p as the highest share
such that, for all pi  p, wi (ei) increases with pi. Let e denote the
corresponding e¤ort, such that d (e; p) = 0:
Of particular interest is the question of how very scarce symbols
can be sustained in equilibrium. Such symbols permit small radical
groups to commit to very high levels of cooperation as well as very high
payo¤s during a homogeneous partnership, but they also imply a very
high reward for cheating, which can only be countered by the prospect
of a long search time after break-up. For the case of unilateral symbol
switching, such scarce symbols crucially require high outgoingswitching
costs. Such high switching costs can, e.g., reect ethnic markers, or to a
lesser extent language or religion. Caselli and Coleman (2013) argue that
conicts often develop along ethnic divides, since ethnic markers cannot
easily be switched by members of the losing side. Besides symbols that
are physically hard to switch, such as skin color, this equally applies to
religion, where religious people may be extremely unwilling to give up
their beliefs in face of a divine judgement or an eternal afterlife.14
Of course, although the matrix of switching costs c is taken as ex-
ogenously given in the present analysis, (groups of) players can choose
a symbol in function of the desired costs in the real world. Berman
(2000) argues that the Ultra-Orthodox Jews only developed their very
distinctive and stringent traditional practices in the 19th century, when
the economic emancipation of European Jews gave them access to many
new economic opportunities in society at large.
Likewise, Berndt (2007) argues that 19th century Jewish peddlers
cultivated their despised and distinctive status to enable them to act as
middlemen in high stake nancial transactions. Commitment to high
stake interactions requires high exit costs, and this is also the case in
criminal environments. Prison tattoos and initiation rites requiring a
murder allow criminals to trust their partners when their life and free-
dom are at stake. But the same mechanism also o¤ers policy makers a
14Alternatively, even in the presence of very low switching costs, very small groups
can exist in equilibrium if all other symbols have extreme frequencies. For instance,
if c (:) = 0; we must have wj
 
ej

= wi
 
ei

for all i and j in equilibrium. For nitely
many symbols, this is compatible with a pi ! 0 if almost the entire population bears
another symbol sj , while all other symbol frequencies equal pi or zero.
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way to ght crime: subsidizing the outgoing switching costs. Ignoring
other moral, economic and practical issues, o¤ering criminals a way out,
and even allowing them to keep a part of their spoils if they turn on
their accomplices, impedes criminals in committing to criminal cooper-
ations. The legislation on pentiti ensures in that sense a double blow to
organized crime. First, it facilitates convictions, by motivating criminals
to testify against former colleagues in exchange for reduced sentences,
witness protection and a new identity. Secondly, it o¤ers an exit op-
tion, thus reducing criminalspotential to credibly commit to a criminal
endeavour.
It remains to show that at least one e¢ cient segregating PPE exists.
This is done in the following Proposition.
Proposition 4 If  satises condition 1, then for all matrices of symbol
switching costs c; a vector (pi)i=1;:::;n can be found for which an e¢ cient
segregating PPE exists.
The proof of Proposition 4 relies on the fact that the e¤ort levels in
Proposition 1 are well dened if condition 1 is satised, demonstrates
the subgame perfection of the e¢ cient segregating PPE, and argues that
Proposition 3 is always satised for uniform symbol frequencies.
4 Other equilibria and renegotiation
The previous Section characterized one particular PPE out of poten-
tially many PPE. In this Section, we compare the e¢ cient segregating
PPE to some other important PPE, on the basis of tractability and
renegotiation proofness. A rst class of alternative equilibria consists
of symbol-blindPPE, in which the contributed e¤orts are not condi-
tioned on symbols. A rst example of such a symbol-blind PPE is one
in which players never exert positive e¤ort. Clearly, such a PPE always
exists. Second, among the main candidates for a symbol-blind PPE
with strictly positive e¤orts are those which involve a form of gradual
trust-building or incubation. In these equilibria, the equilibrium e¤orts
depend on the age of a partnership, denoted  2 N: In the early rounds
of a partnership, equilibrium e¤orts are low, and the prospect of facing
these low continuation values in a new partnership enables partners to
sustain high e¤orts in later rounds. Thus, a symmetric incubation PPE
is characterized by a sequence (e )=0;1;2;::: which satises innitely many
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incentive compatibility constraints, such that for all  = 0; 1; 2; ::::15
 (e ; e )  (0; e )+
1X
j=1
( (1  ))j ( (ej+ ; ej+ )   (ej 1; ej 1))  0:
(7)
The incentive compatibility constraints in (7) require that, for all  , the
expected future benets of being  + 1 rounds further in a partnership
exceed the benets of shirking in the  -th round (and having to start
trust-buildinganew). In addition, players only terminate a partner-
ship if their partner deviates from the equilibrium play. E¢ ciency then
implies maximizing
1X
=0
( (1  ))  (e ; e ) ; (8)
subject to (7) : This characterization illustrates that nding gradual
symbol-blind equilibria can be quite tedious in the present public goods
game setting, and that nding e¢ cient equilibria will be very di¢ cult.
Hence, in the context of an innitely repeated public goods game,
the e¢ cient segregating PPE is more simple and intuitive than the main
contenders, i.e., the gradual trust-building PPE. Moreover, Ghosh and
Ray (1996) show that gradual trust-building equilibria are vulnerable to
renegotiation by current partners. In the present context of repeated
bilateral interactions, this seems particularly disturbing. If we consider,
e.g., an equilibrium without cooperation, then by denition no player
wants to unilaterally deviate to exerting e¤ort while his partner sticks
to the equilibrium zero e¤ort strategy. But if the two current partners
can mutually improve themselves by jointly deviating to strictly posi-
tive e¤orts, and if such a joint deviation is incentive compatible, then we
expect both players to take advantage of it. Unfortunately, none of the
PPE seems to satisfy standard renegotiation proofness in the current
setting. Therefore, we introduce a parametrized version of renegotia-
tion proofness, called "-renegotiation proofness, in order to measure the
vulnerability of di¤erent PPE w.r.t. renegotiation within a partnership.
"-renegotiation proofness bounds the sizeof a renegotiation from above,
and encompasses standard notions of renegotiation proofness as a special
case. We dene the distance between two strategies  and 0 as
sup
ht
m ( (ht) ; 
0 (ht)) ;
15The derivation of (7) and (8) is presented in Appendix A.2.
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in which m (:) represents, for the sake of simplicity, a continuously dif-
ferentiable function that strictly increases with respect to the di¤erences
in e¤orts, measured by the Euclidian metric, and di¤erences in termi-
nation decisions and symbol switching, which are both measured by a
discrete metric. We then dene "-renegotiation proofness w.r.t. bilateral
deviations by current partners as follows.
Denition 2 ("-renegotiation proofness) A PPE in pure strategies
is "-renegotiation proof w.r.t. bilateral deviations by current partners if
no pair of current partners can mutually benet from an incentive com-
patible joint deviation, such that for each players equilibrium strategies
 and deviating strategies 0; we have suphtm ( (ht) ; 
0 (ht))  ":
Note that if " ! 1, "-renegotiation proofness reduces to Ghosh
and Rays (1996) criterion of bilateral rationality, albeit without its re-
striction to players who have not deviated in their past arrangements
with each other. Thus, we use the notion of "-renegotiation proofness
as a yardstick to compare PPEs in terms of their robustness w.r.t. joint
deviations.
First, we consider the symbol-blind equilibria. The vulnerability
of gradual trust-building equilibria to bilateral deviations by current
partners was shown by Ghosh and Ray (1996) and naturally extends to
the present case of joint deviations of a restricted size.
Proposition 5 For all " > 0; only PPE in which e¤ort levels are con-
stant with respect to the age of the partnership  satisfy "-renegotiation
proofness. Symbol-blind PPE generically never satisfy "-renegotiation
proofness.
To provide some intuition: note that, regarding what players can
expect from a new partnership, the equilibrium e¤ort sequence e xes
the same outside option for all players, independent of the age of their
current partnership. If this outside option makes high e¤orts enforce-
able in later rounds of a partnership, then these high e¤orts are equally
enforceable in the rst round. As long as all others play the equilibrium
strategies, two current partners can mutually improve themselves by
jointly deviating to higher e¤orts in the rst round of their partnership,
up to the point where they exert the highest sustainable e¤orts. And
such a joint deviation is protable for both partners even if we only allow
for a very small deviation. Hence, robustness against even the smallest
joint deviations requires that the equilibrium e¤orts are independent of
the partnerships age. The non-existence of "-renegotiation proof PPE
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for any " is then immediate. If the constant equilibrium e¤orts are high,
then they violate incentive compatibility. If they are low, then they con-
stitute a bad outside option, giving rise to bilateral deviations to higher
e¤orts. An "-renegotiation proof symbol-blind PPE typically only exists
if (1   ) = 0; i.e., if players e¤ectively play a sequence of one shot
public goods games.
Let us now turn to the e¢ cient segregating PPE. In order to satisfy "-
renegotiation proofness, the e¢ cient segregating PPE needs to be robust
to two kinds of (su¢ ciently small) joint deviations. First, the equilibrium
has to be robust to joint deviations in homogeneous partnerships: e¤ort
levels should be su¢ ciently high in homogeneous partnerships to avoid
that low equilibrium e¤orts allow two same symbol players to credibly
commit to a joint deviation to higher e¤orts. From (1), (2) and (3) ;
and keeping wi (ei) xed at the e¢ cient segregating PPE level, we have
that a joint deviation to higher e¤orts e in a homogeneous si partnership
with equilibrium e¤ort ei is viable if
d (e; 0) =
 (e; e)
1   (1  )    (0; e)  
(1  ) (1  )
1   (1  ) w
i
 
ei

: (9)
Furthermore, (9) is satised with equality for e = ei: By Lemma 1,
the left hand side of (9) is decreasing with e for e  e, such that
robustness to joint deviations in homogeneous partnerships requires that
pi is smaller than p for all i.16
Second, the e¢ cient segregating PPE crucially depends on segrega-
tion to sustain cooperation. As such, this PPE can only be "-renegotiation
proof if players are not tempted to break out of this segregation by
jointly deviating to cooperation in a heterogeneous partnership, in or-
der to avoid waiting for a same symbol partner. Consider the case of
a pair of si and sj players, and assume without loss of generality that
pi  pj < p: Clearly, joint deviations to e¤orts above ej are not credi-
ble, because they fail to satisfy incentive compatibility for the sj player.
The si player should thus settle for less e¤orts than his equilibrium ef-
forts in homogeneous partnerships but can nevertheless be tempted to
avoid waiting for a homogeneous partnership. Because cooperation in
heterogeneous partnerships requires a deviation in termination decisions
and a deviation from zero e¤orts, this is where the parametrization of
"-renegotiation proofness has a bite. Let e^ (") denote the maximal e¤ort
allowed in a deviation of size " from zero e¤ort which also deviates in the
termination decision. Note that e^ (:) is well dened by the assumptions
16Note that the generic non-existence of an "-renegotiation proof symbol-blind PPE
can be understood as a special case, where pi = 1.
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imposed on the functions m and : Now " constrains the temptation of
heterogeneous cooperation, up to the point where e^ (") = e; after which
further increases in " are not binding. It can be shown that a su¢ cient
condition for a joint deviation to e^ (") to not be viable reads:17
 (e^ (") ; e^ ("))
1   (1  )    (0; e^ (")) <
 (1  ) (1  )
1   (1  ) w
i
 
ei

: (10)
Note that wi (ei) strictly increases with pi for pi < p by Lemma 1, such
that we can dene p^ (") as the inmum of the set of pis for which (10)
is satised. Summarizing, we have the following result:
Proposition 6 The e¢ cient segregating PPE is "-renegotiation proof if
pi 2 (p^ (") ; p]for all i. Moreover, p^ (") strictly increases with " and this
up to the point where e^ (") = e: For higher ", no e¢ cient segregating
PPE satises "-renegotiation proofness.
Hence, whereas the former symbol-blind PPE is vulnerable w.r.t.
renegotiation for every " > 0, the e¢ cient segregating PPE is more
robust in the sense that only for values of " that are too large, the
segregation PPE fails "- renegotiation proofness. In our closed form
example, p^ (") takes a simple form.
Example 3 In the closed form example,
d (e; 0) =
1
1   (1  )
e
1 + e
  e
is a continuous and strictly concave function of e, with a unique maxi-
mum at
e =
1p
1   (1  )   1;
such that p =
p
1 (1 ) (1 (1 ))
(1 ) : Moreover, p^ (") solves (10) with
equality, such that
p^ (") =

1
(1  )    1

e^ (") :
This means that p < p^ (") as long as e^ (") < 1p
1 (1 )   1: Figure 1
illustrates the pi viable with an "-renegotiation proof e¢ cient segregating
PPE for e^ (") = 0:1:
17See the proof of Proposition 6 in Appendix A.3.
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Figure 1: Closed form example: p, p^ (") and the pi consistent with an
"-renegotiation proof e¢ cient segregating PPE (vertically hatched area)
for e^ (") = 0:1.
Of course, the principal reason that the e¢ cient segregated PPE is
robust with respect to su¢ ciently small joint deviations by current part-
ners, unlike symbol-blind PPE, lies in the radically di¤erent equilibrium
e¤orts in homogeneous and heterogeneous partnerships. Restrictions on
the size of joint deviations constrain in particular the protability of
deviations to cooperation in heterogeneous partnerships. As such, the
restriction to small joint deviations can be understood as a reduced form
of a model where other factors impede joint deviations in heterogeneous
partnerships, and unbounded renegotiation proofness can thus be ob-
tained by, e.g., permutations in the players preferences.18 One example
of such impediments are chauvinist or intolerant preferences, as mod-
elled by Corneo and Jeanne (2009, 2010). Corneo and Jeanne study the
evolution of intolerance, i.e., how the appreciation for diversity (tol-
erance) evolves, by considering how parents socialize their children by
dividing a unit of symbolicvaluation over di¤erent types people, e.g.,
di¤erent professions, sexual orientations or ethnicities. Their o¤springs
later evaluation of their own life then depends on how this distribu-
tion of valuations matches their own profession, sexual orientation or
frequent interaction with other ethnicities. Corneo and Jeanne show
that parents choose a narrow distribution of valuations (intolerance) in
static and predictable environments. This maximizes their o¤springs
expected valuation of their own life, but can also induce them to avoid
18In a related setting, Choy (2014) shows how reputational concerns can discour-
age joint deviations to heterogeneous cooperation in a repeated public goods game
setting with endogenous partnership termination, in which players observe the group
a¢ liations of their partnersprevious partners. Choy characterizes an equilibrium in
which identiable groups are hierarchically ordered and members of higher groups
protect their reputation by refusing any contact with members of lower groups, which
in turn ensures a su¢ ciently low outside option to sustain cooperation.
21
certain professional choices or interactions at the cost of foregoing eco-
nomic opportunities. In dynamic environments, parents choose to raise
their o¤spring in tolerance.
The present paper adds a second rationale for intolerance. If coop-
eration is sustained by segregation and if its sustainability is at risk due
to the possibility of heterogeneous cooperation, then certain groups can
choose to promote intolerance, i.e., stimulate members to develop a disu-
tility from cooperating with players bearing a di¤erent symbol. Assume
that a round of cooperation in a heterogeneous partnership comes at a
disutility cost   0; such that a player receives stage payo¤
 (e; e0) 
from a round in which he exerts strictly positive e¤ort in a heterogeneous
partnership. Dene then a threshold value,
 = max
e
fd (e; 0)g  min
ei

d
 
ei; 0
	
; (11)
in order to state the following result.
Proposition 7 If an e¢ cient segregating PPE is "-renegotiation proof
for some "; then it is "-renegotiation proof for all " > 0 if all players suf-
fer a disutility 
1 (1 ) >
 in each stage of heterogeneous cooperation.
If e globally maximizes wi (ei) and pi = p for all i; then  = 0; and
any  > 0 su¢ ces to make the e¢ cient segregating PPE "-renegotiation
proof for all " > 0:Moreover, one can further weaken the degree of intol-
erance required to avoid joint deviations to heterogeneous cooperation
in several interesting ways. First, to avoid bilateral deviations to het-
erogeneous cooperation between si and sj players, it su¢ ces that only
one of both partners is intolerant. Second, if only a share of si play-
ers have such intolerant preferences and if these preferences are private
information, then a relatively small share of intolerant players with a
su¢ ciently high  can be an e¤ective deterrent of heterogeneous coop-
eration. The possibility of being defected upon by an intolerant player
and su¤ering a negative stage payo¤ can be quite e¤ective in preventing
players from committing to a joint deviation in heterogeneous coopera-
tion. This o¤ers an interesting perspective on terrorist attacks, by which
radical proponents of strong homogeneous communities use the power
of mass media to suggest that a signicant share of, e.g., Muslims hold
intolerant preferences. A su¢ ciently large share of one group coming to
believe in the existence of a share of intolerant players in the another
group can already su¢ ce to preclude all players from both groups from
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credibly committing to heterogeneous cooperation. If Islamic State or
Al Qaeda change how all Muslims are perceived by enough people in the
West, then their activities facilitate the enforcement of cooperation and
social norms in Muslim communities in Western countries.
Note that the above considerations regarding "-renegotiation proof-
ness assumed strategy proles and joint deviations without symbol switch-
ing. Yet, the possibility of joint deviations also a¤ects symbol switch-
ing. Assume again a new partnership between an si and an sj player,
with pi < pj: Where unilateral symbol switching is excluded by Propo-
sition 3 if the switching costs exceed the di¤erence continuation val-
ues jwj (ej)  wi (ei)j, allowing for joint deviations enables current part-
ners to jointly deviate by continuing the partnership and having one
switching symbol. After this joint deviation, they continue cooperating
in a now homogeneous partnership at equilibrium e¤ort levels. Note
that this joint deviation qualies as a small renegotiation if metric m
puts little weight on changes in termination and symbol switching de-
cisions, because it requires no changes in e¤ort decisions. In this case,
"-renegotiation proofness imposes additional restrictions on the symbol
frequencies or on the matrix of symbol switching costs c: Consider again
a small pi, entailing high e¤orts ei in homogeneous partnerships. If play-
ers can jointly deviate in termination and symbol switching decisions,
then they can circumvent the high search costs of nding another si
player, thus making ei unsustainable. Therefore, a small pi is in this
case only viable in an "-renegotiation proof e¢ cient segregating PPE if
the outgoing symbol switching costs c (i; :) are high enough to avoid si
players unilaterally leaving the group (cfr. supra), and if the incoming
symbol switching costs c (:; i) is su¢ ciently high, to avoid players moving
into the group of si players by means of joint deviations.
Moreover, whereas uniform zero symbol switching costs, c (:) = 0;
are compatible with an e¢ cient segregating PPE if we only consider
unilateral symbol switching (e.g., if pi = p for all i), allowing for joint
deviations in termination and symbol switching decisions always requires
strictly positive switching costs. To see this, note that an sj player is
not willing to switch to si in a joint deviation if

 
wi
 
ei

+ (1  )vi(ei)  c (j; i) < wj  ej ;
which can be arranged into an inequality
+ (1  )

 +
1  
pi

wi
 
ei
  wj  ej < c (j; i)

:
Clearly,  + (1   )

 + 1 
pi

> 1 for all pi < 1; such that this in-
equality represents the seduction of immediate cooperation. Without
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switching costs and if players only cooperate in homogeneous partner-
ships, one player is always willing to switch to his partners symbol in
a heterogeneous partnership by means of a joint deviation, in order to
avoid waiting for a homogenous partnership. Thus, allowing for joint
deviations in termination and symbol switching decisions implies that
cooperation can only be sustained if symbol switching is costly.
To conclude this Section, we briey consider another family of ef-
cient symbol-dependent PPE. Consider a PPE in which players only
exert e¤ort in a heterogeneous partnership with one particular other
symbol. E.g., the si players only exert positive e¤orts when partnered
with an sj player, and vice versa. Of course, this equilibrium is largely
equivalent to the e¢ cient segregating PPE if pi = pj: Otherwise, say
if pi < pj; e¢ ciency no longer implies symmetry in cooperative part-
nerships. If both players exert e¤orts on the incentive compatibility
constraint, then the sj is worse o¤ than the si player for several reasons.
First, the sj player, bearing the more frequent symbol, can credibly com-
mit to higher e¤orts than the si player. This higher e¤ort level makes
him worse o¤ than his partner as well as worse o¤ than he would be
if both exerted the highest incentive compatible e¤ort of the si player.
Second, the more frequent symbol sj player on average faces a longer
search time for an si partner, which is what constitutes his ability to
commit to higher e¤orts. Third, this selection e¤ect now makes that the
vector of p values exacerbates the di¤erences in symbol frequencies at
the population level, rather than smoothening them as in the e¢ cient
segregating PPE (see Proposition 2). For all these reasons, the condi-
tions for the existence and "-renegotiation proofness of such a PPE are
much more stringent than for the e¢ cient segregating PPE.
5 Conclusion
By inducing segregation, payo¤ irrelevant symbols can help to sustain
cooperation in an innitely repeated public goods game with endoge-
nous partnership termination and no information about a partners past
play. If players only cooperate with partners bearing the same symbol,
then the consequent search for a new homogenous partnership constrains
the continuation value after a defection. Due to the fact that a more
scarce symbol implies on average a longer search for a homogeneous
partnership, it also enables players to sustain higher e¤orts. This idea of
symbols inducing a sacrice of outside options is closer to Iannaccones
(1992) club theoretic approach than, e.g., Eeckhouts (2006) analysis,
where players eventually cooperate with all others after an incubation
period, and symbols allow for Pareto improvements upon this incuba-
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tion equilibrium by serving as a public correlation device. At the same
time, the reaction to symbols which pose no intrinsic impediment to out-
group interactions (e.g., clothing, hairstyles, veils) is xed by a notion
of equilibrium, where the reaction to this kind of symbols is typically
exogenously assumed in Iannaccones (1992) club theoretic setting.
Ghosh and Ray (1996) show that equilibria featuring a gradual in-
crease of e¤orts throughout partnerships are vulnerable to bilateral rene-
gotiation. As long as the rest of the population plays the equilibrium
strategy of low initial cooperation, and thus provides the incentives to
sustain cooperation in a later stage, two partners can benet from jointly
deviating to immediate cooperation. In the present setting, the e¢ cient
segregating equilibrium is equally vulnerable to such joint deviations
but satises a weaker parametrized version of renegotiation proofness,
"-renegotiation proofness, as long as joint deviations are not too big.
Symbol-blind equilibria, on the other hand, fail to satisfy "-renegotiation
proofness even for the smallest joint deviations.
The restriction of renegotiation proofness to su¢ ciently small joint
deviations mainly a¤ects joint deviations to cooperation in heteroge-
neous partnerships, and this can thus be understood as a reduced form of
a model with other obstacles to heterogeneous cooperation. The present
analysis thus o¤ers an additional perspective on the rationale for intoler-
ant preferences, as analyzed in Corneo and Jeanne (2009, 2010). Com-
munities can encourage intolerant preferences, by which players su¤er
an intrinsic disutility cost from cooperating with partners bearing a dif-
ferent symbol, in order to enforce cooperation and norm adhesion. In
this context, it is worth noting that robustness against joint deviations
to heterogeneous cooperation does not require all players to object to
heterogeneous cooperation. Players cannot credibly commit to a joint
deviation to heterogeneous cooperation if one of the two players is intol-
erant, or even if players are uncertain about whether a partner bearing
a di¤erent symbol may face such objections. This suggests that terrorist
attacks or xenophobe political discourses can be interpreted to exploit
the power of mass media in order to cast doubt on the true preferences
of members of another community. If su¢ ciently many members in one
community doubt the true intentions of members of the other commu-
nity, or if members of one community fear that too many people in
another community have doubts about the true intentions of the former
communitys members, then this prevents that players from committing
to cooperation in a heterogeneous partnership. Impeding integration
between the di¤erent communities then facilitates the preservation of
traditional community norms.
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A group symbol of particular interest in this context is the Mus-
lim veil, due to the controversy surrounding the legal ban on veiling in
public schools in France and other Western European countries. One
principal motivation for such measures is the integration and emancipa-
tion of Muslim women in Western countries.19 However, Carvalho (2013)
presents a compelling interpretation of veiling as facilitating the emanci-
pation of Muslim women. By wearing a veil, Muslim women reduce their
exposure to the temptations of Western society as well as their commu-
nitys beliefs that they might give in to such temptations. Therefore,
this allows them to seize the social and economic opportunities without
social repercussions from their community. Carvalho argues that a ban
on veiling can cause Muslim women to substitute veiling by segregation
and a withdrawal from an integrated public life. The present paper adds
to this line of reasoning and presents a specic formal mechanism where
Carvalhos analysis on a veil reducing temptation remains implicit. If a
legal ban on veiling or merely the public debate about it makes wearing
a veil more controversial, and thus casts more doubt in the majority
populations mind about the true preferences of Muslim women, then it
will be harder for the latter to establish interactions outside their own
community. In this fashion, debates about a veil ban as well as Salast
extremism and xenophobe rhetorics contribute to the ability of Muslim
communities to enforce traditional social norms upon their members.
We conclude with a nal caveat on possible policy implications of
the present analysis. Social norms and group cooperation can be both a
source of emancipation and conict, as well as a source of both creation
and destruction of welfare. In light of the present analysis and abstract-
ing from all other concerns, the welfare assessment of segregation and
its e¤ects on cooperation depends foremost on whether and how higher
e¤ort levels contribute to societal welfare. The same mechanisms can be
employed by some groups to cooperate in enhancing science and eman-
cipation, while at the same time by others to expropriate the poor or
support a totalitarian regime.
References
Aimone, J. A., L. R. Iannaccone, M. D. Makowsky, and J. Ru-
bin (2013): Endogenous Group Formation via Unproductive
19For instance, the prominent French feminist and politician Fadela Amara, an
Algerian-born Muslim woman, defends the French ban of the niqab because "women
wearing a niqab or burqa will never become pilot, doctor or teacher. In reality, they
are bound to remain conned to their homes." (see: "Fadela Amara dénonce «le
fascisme» de «lintégrisme musulman» " in Le Parisien, 29/12/2010)
26
Costs,Review of Economic Studies, 80(4), 12151236.
Berman, E. (2000): Sect, subsidy, and sacrice: An economists view
of ultra-orthodox jews, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115,
905953.
Berndt, C. E. H. (2007): Hostile territory - High-tension religion and
the Jewish peddler,American Journal of Economics and Sociol-
ogy, 66(5), 10051027.
Carvalho, J.-P. (2013): Veiling, The Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 128(1), 337270.
Caselli, F., and W. J. Coleman (2013): On the theory of ethnic
conict,Journal of the European Economic Association, 11(s1),
161192.
Choy, J. P. (2014): Constructing Social Division to support Coopera-
tion: Theory and Evidence from Nepal,Working paper, Warwick
University.
Corneo, G., and O. Jeanne (2009): A theory of tolerance,Journal
of Public Economics, 93(5-6), 691 702.
(2010): Symbolic values, occupational choice, and economic
development,European Economic Review, 54(2), 237 251.
Datta, S. (1996): Building Trust,Working paper, London School of
Economics.
Deb, J., and J. Gonzalez-Diaz (2014): Enforcing Social Norms:
Trust-building and community enforcement, Working paper,
Stanford University.
Eeckhout, J. (2006): Minorities and endogenous segregation,Re-
view of Economic Studies, 73, 3153.
Ellison, G. (1994): Cooperation in the prisoners dilemma with
anonymous random matching,The Review of Economic Studies,
61(3), 567588.
Fujiwara-Greve, T., and M. Okuno-Fujiwara (2009): Voluntar-
ily Separable Repeated Prisoners Dilemma,Review of Economic
Studies, 76(3), 9931021.
Fujiwara-Greve, T., M. Okuno-Fujiwara, and N. Suzuki
(2012): Voluntarily separable repeated Prisoners Dilemma with
reference letters,Games and Economic Behavior, 74(2), 504516.
Gambetta, D. (2009): Codes of the Underworld: How Criminals Com-
municate. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey.
27
Ghosh, P., and D. Ray (1996): Cooperation in community inter-
action without information ows, Review of Economic Studies,
63(3), 491519.
Greif, A. (1993): Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions
in Early Trade: The Maghribi TradersCoalition,American Eco-
nomic Review, 83(3), 525548.
Iannaccone, L. R. (1992): Sacrice and Stigma - Reducing Free-
Riding in Cults, Communes, and Other Collectives, Journal of
Political Economy, 100, 271291.
Kandori, M. (1992): Social norms and community enforcement,The
Review of Economic Studies, 59(1), 6380.
Kranton, R. E. (1996): The formation of cooperative relationships,
Journal of Law, Economics & Organization, 12(1), 214233.
Mailath, G. J., L. Samuelson, and A. Shaked (2000): Endoge-
nous inequality in integrated labor markets with two-sided search,
American Economic Review, pp. 4672.
Okuno-Fujiwara, M., and A. Postlewaite (1995): Social Norms
and Random Matching Games,Games and Economic Behavior,
9, 79109.
Peski, M., and B. Szentes (2013): Spontaneous discrimination,
The American economic review, 103(6), 24122436.
Sandler, T., and J. Tschirhart (1997): Club theory: Thirty years
later,Public Choice, 93(3-4), 335355.
Schumacher, H. (2013): Imitating cooperation and the formation
of long-term relationships,Journal of Economic Theory, 148(1),
409417.
Shimizu, H. (2011): Social cohesion and self-sacricing behavior,
Public Choice, 149(3-4), 427440.
Tajfel, H., and J. C. Turner (1979): The Social Psychology of In-
tergroup Relationschap. An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Con-
ict. Brooks/Cole, Monterey.
Takahashi, S. (2010): Community enforcement when players observe
partnerspast play.,Journal of Economic Theory, 145(1), 4262.
Watson, J. (1999): Starting small and renegotiation,Journal of eco-
nomic Theory, 85(1), 5290.
(2002): Starting small and commitment,Games and Eco-
nomic Behavior, 38(1), 176199.
28
A Mathematical Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Solving (1) and (2) for vi (ei) and wi (ei), one obtains
vi (ei) =
1
1  
1  (1  pi) 
1   (1  pi) (1  )
 
ei; ei

(12)
and
wi
 
ei

=
1
1  
pi
1   (1  pi) (1  )
 
ei; ei

: (13)
Substituting (12) and (13) into the incentive compatibility constraint in
(3) ; and noting that e¢ ciency implies that the incentive constraint in
(3) is satised with equality, we obtain after rearranging terms:
d
 
ei; pi

=
 (ei; ei)
1   (1  ) (1  pi)   
 
0; ei

= 0: (14)
Note that this also means that ei solves
 (ei; ei)
 (0; ei)
= 1   (1  )  1  pi :
Under condition 1, it cannot be excluded that (e;e)
(0;e)
strictly increases
with e on some intervals of R+. By e¢ ciency, we select the highest e
satisfying (14) by means of the maximum operator in (4) :
This characterization of ei is well dened if  satises condition 1,
as the ratio (e;e)
(0;e)
continuously maps R+ on the entire unit interval.
First, continuity is implied by the continuous di¤erentiability of ; and
(e;e)
(0;e)
2 [0; 1] for all e because 1 (:)  0 and  (e; e)  0 for all e; and
because 2 is bounded away from zero. Second, lime!0+
(e;e)
(0;e)
= 1 by the
third part of condition 1. This also means that limpi!1  ei = 0. And
third, lime!1
(e;e)
(0;e)
= 0 by the boundedness of  (e; e) and because 2 (:)
is bounded away from zero.
Finally, note that ei decreases continuously with pi; except where ei
constitutes a local maximum of (e;e)
(0;e)
:At such point, (4) decreases discon-
tinuously to a lower e¤ort level, such that ei constitutes left-continuous
and strictly decreasing function of pi. In a similar fashion, ei is right-
continuous and strictly increasing function of  (1  ) :
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Proof of Proposition 2
First, xi = 
pi+(1 pi) follows directly from (5) and x
i
t = x
i
t+1 = x
i: By
Bayes rule, the population share of si-players then equals:
pi
xiP
j
pj
xj
:
Substituting xi = 
pi+(1 pi) ; p
i exceeds this population share if:
pi >
pi (pi + (1  pi))P
j p
j (pj + (1  pj))
, (1  )
X
j
 
pj
2
+  > (1  ) pi + 
, pi <
X
j
 
pj
2
:
Proof of Proposition 3
An si player in a heterogeneous partnership wishes to switch to symbol
sj if
c (i; j) + wj
 
ej

> wi
 
ei

;
while an si player in a homogeneous partnership switches to symbol sj
if

 
0; ei

+ c (i; j) + wj
 
ej

> vi
 
ei

:
Because (3) is satised with equality in equilibrium, both these inequal-
ities are equivalent. In a homogeneous partnership, switching symbol
after a defection strictly dominates switching symbol after exerting the
equilibrium e¤ort, as argued in the text. Rearranging terms gives the
inequality provided in Proposition 3.
Proof of Lemma 1
Using the expected continuation value when matched with a randomly
drawn partner, wi (ei),
wi
 
ei

=
pi (0; ei)
1   ;
and noting that  (0; :) is a continuous map (by Condition 1), wi (ei) is
a continuous composition of ei, which itself, by Proposition 1, is a left
continuous function of pi. Therefore, wi (ei) is a left-continuous function
of pi. As ei decreases at each discontinuity, and  (0; :) is increasing,
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wi (ei) is decreasing at each discontinuity. Using the characterization of
ei, we have that:
lim
pi!0

 
0; ei

= lim
pi!0
 (ei; ei)
1  (1  pi) (1  ) :
And for xed (1  ) bounded away from 1, the latter limit exists and
is bounded, because  (e; e) is bounded for all e 2 R+ (by Condition 1).
Therefore,
lim
pi!0
wi
 
ei

=
1
1   limpi!0
pi (ei; ei)
1  (1  pi) (1  ) = 0:
In case pi ! 1, we have that ei ! 0 such that  (0; ei) converges to
zero, and therefore, limpi!1wi (ei) = 0. Consider a pi at which wi (ei) is
di¤erentiable. Now, solving for vi (ei) in (1) gives us:
vi
 
ei

=
 (ei; ei)
1  (1  ) +

1  (1  )w
i
 
ei

: (15)
Now substitute (3) with equality for vi (ei) in (15). Rearranging terms,
we obtain:
(1  )(1  )
1  (1  ) w
i
 
ei

=
 (ei; ei)
1  (1  )   
 
0; ei

:
Since ei is decreasing with pi, wi (ei) increases with pi if and only if,
@d (ei; 0)
@ei
 0:
Proof of Proposition 4
We now show that the e¢ cient segregating PPE, as dened in Denition
1, is indeed a PPE in pure strategies, and that vector (pi) exists for all
matrices of symbol switching costs, (c (i; j))i;j, such that the e¢ cient seg-
regating PPE can be sustained as an equilibrium. First, by Proposition
1, the equilibrium e¤orts in ((4)) are always well dened under condition
1. Given that all deviations are met with a partnership termination, no
unilateral deviation from ei can increase a players continuation value by
construction. And because all deviations in termination decisions after a
deviation are met with partnership termination, this equilibrium is also
subgame perfect. Finally, we need that the condition in Proposition 3
that excludes symbol switching,
wj
 
ej
  wi  ei  c (i; j)

;
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is satised for some vector (pi) for all matrices of symbol switching costs,
(c (i; j))i;j. Note that for a vector of equal components, p
i = pj = p for
all i; j, we have wi (ei) = wj (ej), which implies that the inequality in
Proposition 3 is satised for all (c (i; j))i;j : 
A.2 Derivation of (7) and (8)
We briey illustrate the derivation of (7). Note that after k rounds
of equilibrium play, the expected continuation value on the equilibrium
path is
 (ek; ek) +  ((1  ) (ek+1; ek+1) +  (e0; e0))
+ 2
 
(1  )2  (ek+2; ek+2) +  (1  )  (e1; e1) + 2 (e0; e0)

+ 3
 
(1  )3  (ek+3; ek+3) +  (1  )2  (e2; e2) + 2 (1  )  (e1; e1) + 3 (e0; e0)

+ ::: (16)
The expected continuation value of cheating in the k-th is
 (0; ek) +  (e0; e0) + 
2 ((1  ) (e1; e1) +  (e0; e0))
+ 3
 
(1  )2  (e2; e2) + (1  ) (e1; e1) + 2 (e0; e0)

+ ::: (17)
Incentive compatibility requires that the di¤erence between ((16)) and
((17)) is positive. After some algebraic manipulation, we obtain the
constraint in (7).
For the objective function in (8) ; note that at the 0-th round of
cooperation, a player wishes to maximize
 (e0; e0) +  (1  )  (e1; e1) +  (e0; e0)
+ 2 (1  )2  (e2; e2) + 2
 
2 + (1  )  (e0; e0) + 2 (1  ) (e1; e1)
+ :::
=  (e0; e0)
 
1 + 
1X
t=1
t
!
+ (1  )  (e1; e1)
 
1 + 
1X
t=1
t
!
+ ((1  ) )2  (e2; e2)
 
1 + 
1X
t=1
t
!
+ :::
=
1X
k=0
 (ek; ek) ( (1  ))k
 
1 + 
1X
t=1
t
!
=

1 +

1  
 1X
k=0
 (ek; ek) ( (1  ))k :
That means that we seek to maximize
P1
k=0 ( (1  ))k  (ek; ek)
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Proof of Proposition 5
Suppose that players agree on a non-constant e¤ort plan (e )=0;1;:::. This
equilibrium sequence constitutes the outside option at all moments of the
current partnership (i.e., what to expect in the next partnership) and is
thus independent of how far a player is in his current partnership. If at
some  a certain e¤ort e is sustainable, then all e¤orts in time periods
 for which e  e can be renegotiated to level e. Repeat this argument
and conclude that the only e¤ort that is robust to " renegotiation is
a constant and e¢ cient e¤ort level, where e¢ ciency means exhausting
the incentive compatibility constraints. Note that this argument holds
for any " > 0. Now, denote such constant e¢ cient e¤ort level by ~e. Let
v (~e) denote the expected continuation value. Then,
v (~e) =  (~e; ~e) + v (~e) :
In order for ~e to be incentive compatible and e¢ cient, we should have
that:
v (~e) =  (0; ~e) + v (~e) :
But this means that  (0; ~e) =  (~e; ~e), which can only hold for ~e = 0.
Now, consider e (") > 0 a positive e¤ort level that is allowed under our
criterion of "-renegotiation proofness. A joint deviation from zero e¤orts
to e^ (") gives the following expected continuation payo¤:
v (e^ (")) =
 (e^ (") ; e^ ("))
1  (1  ) ;
and incentive compatibility requires that
v (e^ ("))   (0; e^ (")) ;
which is clearly viable. Hence, we can only sustain ~e = 0 in an "-
renegotiation proof PPE in the non-generic case where (1   ) = 0.
Generically, there does not exist a symbol-blind "-renegotiation proof
PPE. 
A.3 Proof of Proposition 6
First, in homogeneous si partnerships, two players who jointly deviate to
an e¤ort level e, permitted as an "-renegotiation, obtain a continuation
value
vh (e) =  (e; e) +  (1  ) vh (e) + wi  ei : (18)
Solving (18) for vh (e) and substituting into the incentive compatibility
constraint
vh (e)   (0; e) + wi  ei ;
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we obtain that a joint deviation to e is only viable if
d (e; 0)   (1  ) (1  )
1   (1  ) w
i
 
ei

: (19)
Note then that (19) is satised with equality for ei by construction, and
that d (e; 0) decreases with e for all e  e; such that if pi  p for all i;
it cannot be that (19) is satised for any e  ei: Hence, a joint deviation
to a higher e¤ort level in a homogeneous partnership is never viable if
pi  p for all i:
Second, consider a pair of players with di¤erent symbols, say an si
and sj player. Suppose without loss of generality that pi  pj < p.
From Lemma 1, it follows that wi (ei)  wj (ej). We now show that the
assumption (10) is su¢ cient to ensure that the e¢ cient segregating PPE
is "-renegotiation proof. The continuation value in a joint heterogeneous
deviation with e¤ort level e^ (") is
vH (e^ (")) =  (e^ (") ; e^ (")) +  (1  ) vH (e^ (")) + wi  ei ;
from which we obtain that joint deviation to heterogeneous cooperation
is viable if
 (e^ (") ; e^ ("))
1   (1  )    (0; e^ (")) 
 (1  ) (1  )
1   (1  ) w
i
 
ei

: (20)
As a result of Lemma 1, the outside continuation value w (ei) is
increasing with pi; therefore, if we use p^ (") to denote the inmum of all
pi  p satisfying (10) (i.e., not satisfying (20)), we see that our e¢ cient
segregating PPE is sustainable if pi > p^ (") :Moreover, p^ (") is increasing
in ". By increasing ", the upper bound of joint deviations, e^ (") increases.
An e¢ cient segregating PPE is sustained as long as e^ (") < ei  e for
all i. When e^ (") = e, then p^ (") = p, and therefore, the interval of
feasible shares pi becomes empty and the e¢ cient segregating PPE is no
longer "-renegotiation proof.

Proof of Proposition 7
Consider an si and sj player considering a joint deviation. Note that the
sj-player can at most exert e¤ort up until ej (by incentive compatibility),
whereas the si-player can exert e¤orts at a higher level, until a maximum
level of ei. The (expected) continuation value of a joint deviation to some
level e for si reads:
vi (e) =
 (e; e) 
1  (1  ) +
wi (ei)
1  (1  ) : (21)
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Now, let  > , where  is dened as in (11). The si-player will not
comply to the deviation if
vi (e) < (0; e
i) + wi
 
ei

; (22)
which, after substitution of (21) and using (9) (where the inequality is
replaced by an equality) becomes:
d (e; 0)  d  ei; 0 < 
1  (1  ) : (23)
Notice that the left-hand side of (23) is smaller than ; hence, for

1 (1 ) >
, (23) is satised. Furthermore, as only the si-player can
exert higher e¤orts in an asymmetric deviation, if (23) is fullled, then
no such asymmetric deviations are viable, as the consequent (expected)
continuation value of such asymmetric deviations would be even lower
than the corresponding continuation value in the symmetric deviation
considered here. 
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